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With the recent rise of nationalist populism, international institutions worldwide have wit-
nessed an increase in animosities, boycotts, and withdrawals. The British withdrawal from the 
European Union arguably marks the most significant instance of this phenomenon to date. A 
growing literature examines the origins of populist successes such as the Brexit vote and ex-
plores if similar economic, social, and political conditions could fuel equivalent disintegration 
processes elsewhere. However, less is known about the extent to which such withdrawal epi-
sodes themselves affect populist pressures for re-nationalization. In this paper, we argue that 
because the first large-scale disintegration episodes such as Brexit provide new information 
about the feasibility and desirability of re-nationalization policies, they will affect partisan dis-
course about similar populist projects in other countries: Depending on the success of such 
precedents, populists abroad will be encouraged or deterred to follow a similar path. We ex-
plore this argument based on a quantitative text analyses of media reports in selected Euro-
pean countries. Our results show that populists in Europe significantly moderate their de-
mands as the Brexit-drama unfolds, suggesting that Brexit provides a reality check for populist 
pro-Leave arguments. We simultaneously see intra-EU cohesion increase and mainstream dis-
course become more pro-European. We discuss the implications of our findings for populism 
and international institutions more generally.   
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1   Introduction  
Since roughly the beginning of the twenty-first century, established Western democracies have 
witnessed a marked rise in support for nationalist populist movements. This trend has gone hand 
in hand with increased demands for a re-nationalization of economic and political activity. As a 
result, the hitherto dominant drive toward constantly deepening globalization and international 
integration that characterized the second half the previous century has come under pressure. These 
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developments have caused considerable concern among political commentators, mainstream pol-
iticians, and the wider public in Europe and North America. The content of these concerns goes 
well beyond narrow economic interests. Rather, it often pertains to fundamental questions of the 
political organization of modern societies, both domestically and internationally. With regard to 
the domestic arena, observers worry about populism with an eye to social cohesion, political po-
larization, and the stability of democracy itself (Gidron and Hall 2020, Galston 2018). With regard 
to the international arena – the focus of this study – concern stems from the fact that populist 
rhetoric is more often than not explicitly directed against outsiders, foreign countries, or interna-
tional institutions.  
The rise of populism therefore has potentially severe repercussions for international coopera-
tion and the post-war international order more broadly (Blyth 2016, Hobolt 2016 Ikenberry 2018, 
Pepinsky and Walter 2019, Rodrik 2017). While a relatively recent phenomenon, the move of na-
tionalist populists from opposition into policy-shaping roles has already resulted in a number of 
substantial reversals of international integration, such as the US withdrawals from WHO and the 
Paris Climate Agreement, its boycott of the WTO dispute settlement system, or the UK’s exit from 
the European Union. International cooperation levels have stagnated in recent years, even though 
there is not (yet) a general trend toward de-globalization in the aggregate (Alter et al. 2016, Cope-
lovitch and Pevehouse 2019, O’Rourke 2019, Pevehouse et al. 2019, Voeten 2019, Walter 2021).  
This apparent trend toward a potential halt or reversion of international integration raises the 
question about the dynamics of this process. Does populist success breed more populist success, 
or do the drastic policy decisions implemented by populists in government deter voters from na-
tionalist populist parties and proposals? In order to better understand how populist pressures may 
spread and what this means for the future of international cooperation, we focus on these feedback 
effects and explore how populist policy experiences in one country travel abroad to affect populist 
discourse and policies in other countries.  
Our argument is that such experiences trigger a learning mechanism, as they change the inter-
pretation of the feasibility of populist policy promises. Learning plays a particularly important role 
in the context of modern populism exactly because populism is a relatively new phenomenon and 
only a handful of populist leaders and parties have so far been voted into office. This means that 
the record of information available on the performance these populists leaders, the viability of 
their policy proposals and the political consequences of pursuing these policies is low – and that, 
therefore, the information value of new incoming pieces of evidence is high.  
We hold that by observing the actions of populist governments or the implementation of pop-
ulist policies party leaders abroad update their priors about the feasibility and consequences of 
such policies. This learning process is therefore likely to affect partisan discourse about similar 
populist projects in other countries. The direction of these effects depends on the fate of these 
policies and their perceptions abroad: successful policies will encourage populists abroad to pursue 
similar strategies, while policies that fail to live up to their promises or are politically detrimental 
to populist politicians and will deter populist parties abroad to promote following a similar path. 
Moreover, we expect deterrence effects to be particularly strong when mainstream governments 
3 
 
in member states of the affected institution worry about encouragement effects at home that would 
lead to further disintegration demands and therefore have incentives not to accommodate nation-
alist populist policies in precedent cases. 
We investigate this argument in the context of the British withdrawal from the EU. The Euro-
pean context is particularly interesting for our purposes because eurosceptic populist parties have 
gained momentum across the continent over the last two decades. While these parties have been 
vocal in their demands, voters have little actual policy evidence on the basis of which to evaluate 
the policy ideas of these parties. This has changed dramatically with the UK’s vote to leave the 
European Union and the election of a government with strong nationalist-populist leaning. The 
Brexit referendum and the UK’s withdrawal from the EU in January 2020 proved that leaving the 
EU is a real possibility. At the same time, the Brexit process gradually revealed dramatic discrep-
ancies between the populist promises of Brexit proponents and the realities of the actual negotia-
tions. Thus, Brexit provides a highly-visible ‘first case’ to learn from context where many potential 
learners have policy goals similar to those of the Brexiteers, and a case which exhibits considerable 
variation in its apparent success over time.   
Drawing on a quantitative text analyses of media reports in Austria, Germany, and Ireland,2 we 
demonstrate that the UK’s Brexit experience significantly impacted domestic discourses about 
Europe in these countries. We document an initial encouragement effect on populist party dis-
course across all three of countries right after the ‘Leave’ campaign won the Brexit referendum. 
The referendum outcome was immediately interpreted as evidence that nationalist, anti-EU refer-
endums can be won in the EU. However, as the Brexit-drama unfolds in less positive ways than 
Brexiteers had predicted, we observe a strong deterrent effect as populist parties and politicians 
throughout our sample significantly moderate their anti-EU rhetoric, in line with evidence that 
documents similar trends in party manifestos (van Kessel et al. 2020). At the same time, we also 
observe that intra-EU cohesion increases and mainstream discourse becomes more pro-European. 
Our findings also imply that these dynamics were reinforced by strategic incentives of the EU to 
discourage imitation effects in other member states. Overall, our results suggest that learning by 
observing the fate of populist projects abroad plays an important role in shaping national populist 
discourses and may put limits on populist campaigns that advocate for withdrawing from interna-
tional institutions.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section lays out our argument and 
theoretical reasoning in detail. Section 3 introduces the empirical case of Brexit as a testing ground 
for our theory. Section 4 presents describes our data and measurement approach along with related 
conceptual questions. Section 5 provides an empirical evidence that shows how well the Brexit 
process is going for the UK at different points in time. Section 6 then presents the results of our 
analysis. Here, we first show the general result that information generated by Brexit counteracts 
populist pressures outside of the UK. We then also show that the Brexit process has led to a more 
pro-European discourse among mainstream parties. Section 7 concludes. 
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2   Background and Theoretical Framework 
In the past decades, nationalist and isolationist political parties, candidates, and policies have be-
come increasingly successful in the national electoral arena (Colantone & Stanig 2019; De Vries et 
al. 2021; Trubowitz & Burgoon 2020). A large and growing literature has examined the structural, 
social, and ideational causes of these successes (for reviews, see for example: Bornschier 2018, 
Guriev and Papaioannou 2020, Rodrik 2020, or Walter 2021). One major finding of this body of 
research is that nationalist-populist messages appeal especially to those voters who worry about 
their economic well-being (e.g., Majlesi et al. 2020, Colantone and Stanig 2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 
Becker et al. 2016), their economic status (Gidron & Hall 2017; Kurer 2020), or feel threatened in 
their national and cultural identity (e.g. Mansfield and Mutz 2013, Hobolt 2016, Margalit 2019, 
Norris and Inglehart 2019).  
Nationalist parties tend to blame these problems predominantly on developments originating 
abroad, such as migration, international trade, or international institutions that limit national sov-
ereignty (Posner 2017, Vasilopoulou et al. 2014).3 Naturally, these parties tend to propose policy 
solutions that center on limiting their country’s and their voters’ exposure to globalization – less 
migration, stronger borders, or fewer internationally binding agreements (Börzel and Risse 2018; 
Hooghe and Marks 2018; Kriesi et al. 2008; Zürn and De Wilde 2016; Voeten 2019).  
Such policy proposals not only cater to the grievances expressed by their voters, however, but 
also serve a strategic purpose: In openly questioning internationally-oriented policies, political en-
trepreneurs such as populist challenger parties politicize formerly widely accepted policies. This 
allows them to gain electoral advantage from driving a wedge between mainstream elites and their 
supporters by mobilizing opposition to international cooperation, especially in a setting in which 
the traditionally strong affiliations between voters and established parties are eroding (De Vries 
and Hobolt 2020). Mainstream parties in Europe tend to be strongly committed to European in-
tegration and the liberal international order, for example (Trubowitz & Burgoon 2020), even 
though not all of their voters and party base share this policy position. This creates incentives for 
challenger parties to politicize new policy issues beyond the economically-focused left-right divide, 
such as migration or international cooperation for their own electoral advantage (Hobolt and De 
Vries 2015; De Vries et al. 2021).  
International institutions thus constitute attractive targets for nationalist-populist blame attrib-
ution (Copelovitch & Pevehouse 2019). The populist aversion to compromise on the one hand 
and to elites on the other hand makes it easy to decry the compromises necessary for multilateral 
decision-making and to frame international bureaucrats as a foreign elite trying to dominate the 
domestic people and the proclaimed national interest (Krieger 2019). The incentives to blame in-
ternational institutions increase the more the institution constrains country’s national sovereignty, 
so that it comes as no surprise that the European Union is a particularly frequent target of populists 
especially in Europe (Rooduijn & van Kessel 2019). A natural implication of this diagnosis is to 
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demand that the country withdraw from these institutions. Several examples from populist politi-
cians’ election campaigns illustrate this point: US presidential candidate Donald Trump promised 
to withdraw the US from the Iran nuclear deal, French presidential candidate Marine Le Pen’s 
proposed to leave the Euro and reintroduce a French national currency, and Jair Bolsonaro’s said 
he planned to pull Brazil out of the Paris Climate agreement. 
Yet sweeping policies such as withdrawing from international institutions are easier proposed 
than implemented. Populist policy promises that offer seemingly simple answers to complex ques-
tions typically do not provide viable solutions to the problems and grievances of their voters (e.g., 
Heinisch 2010, Nadler 2019). As long as these strategies are not put to the test, this is not too 
much of a problem for these parties.  
However, the increasing participation of populist parties in coalition governments, the acces-
sion to power of  populist-dominated governments in major countries such as the US and the UK, 
and the success of populist policy proposals in national referendums means that increasingly, pop-
ulist policies are implemented and put to the test. Once in office, populists – who got elected on 
the basis of far-reaching, but oftentimes unattainable promises – are judged by their observable 
policy performance. This creates considerable tensions for the newly-elected office holders be-
cause, unlike statements made in the election campaign, policy performance is subject to real-world 
constraints. This leads to a phenomenon that Heinisch (2010) calls “success in opposition – failure 
in government.” In similar vein as De Vries and Hobolt (2020), Heinisch (2010: 124) argues that 
the political entrepreneurship of populist parties allows them to “succeed in cobbling together a 
disparate coalition of disaffected voters that transcends traditional political and socio-economic 
cleavage structures;” but that once such a party enters “government in an age in which technical 
expertise is key to achieving optimal policy outcomes, it finds it difficult to deliver” (see also Al-
bertazzi and McDonnell 2005, Zaslove 2012). 
     We argue that the discrepancies between offered (in opposition) and delivered (in govern-
ment) policies generate previously unavailable information about the viability of populist promises 
such as the benefits of leaving an international institution, but also about the political fate of pop-
ulist parties that implement such policies. This allows political parties, voters, and political observ-
ers in other countries to learn from these experiences. 
We particularly focus on the effect of information flows from the experiences of populist gov-
ernments in one country on the stated goals of nationalist-populist opposition parties in other 
countries. We apply findings from the policy diffusion literature on government-to-government 
learning (Gilardi 2016, Graham et al. 2013, Karch 2007) to our theory of party-to-party learning. 
Because transnational learning tends to be particularly strong among ideologically similar govern-
ments (e.g., Grossback et al. 2004), we expect populist parties in one country to be particularly 
receptive to information generated by the experience of their populist counterparts elsewhere, 
especially as ideology and prior beliefs play an important role in how likely parties are to update 
these beliefs (Gilardi 2010; van Kessel et al. 2020).  
Observing the outcomes of implemented policy promises by populist parties abroad and the 
political consequences allows domestic populist parties to update their beliefs about the feasibility 
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and the desirability of promoting similar policies for their own country. The more positive the 
foreign party’s experience, the more this will encourage national populist parties to push for similar 
policies themselves and to increase the salience of the issue in their own rhetoric.4 At the same 
time, observing that the hopes attached to the promised policies cannot be met or that the imple-
mentation of the policies has adverse political, electoral, or organizational consequences for gov-
erning populists is likely to deter populist parties in other countries from promoting similar policy 
proposals at home.      
The policy diffusion literature shows that learning is based in particular on the experiences of 
early adopters of policies (Shipan and Volden 2008). First pieces of new evidence thus provide the 
greatest information value, which is why the first attempts to withdraw from international institu-
tion (and other populist policies) are likely to be particularly influential in providing both positive 
(encouraging) and negative (deterring) imitation incentives.  
According to this logic, the first electoral or policy successes of populist challenger parties in 
one country should therefore provide particular encouragement to other populist parties abroad. 
This is because observing such initial successes underlines the growing electoral potential of pop-
ulist parties and provide incentives for these parties to follow strategies that have already proved 
successful elsewhere. However, the encouragement effects of initial successes will be updated as 
new information on the policy performance and general government experience of populist parties 
accumulates. When the discrepancies between promised and delivered solutions are large, or when 
the political consequences are negative, this information is likely to discourage populist parties 
abroad from pursuing a similar path (Gilardi 2010). As a result of this deterrence effect, we expect 
populist parties in other countries become both less vocal (quantity of statements) and more mod-
erate (quality of statements) about populist policies that do visibly not succeed elsewhere.  
In the context of re-nationalization and de-globalization policies that involve the withdrawal 
from an international institution, we expect this deterrence mechanism to be additionally rein-
forced by the strategic incentives of the international institution’s bureaucracy and remaining mem-
ber states.5 In handling the withdrawal process, the international institution faces a trade-off. On 
the one hand, it has incentives to minimize the immediate costs of the withdrawing state’s depar-
ture by allowing a smooth transition. On the other side, it has incentives to deter imitation effects 
on the side of other current member states by denying such a smooth transition. This trade-off, or 
accommodation dilemma (Walter 2020a, 2020b), between a low-cost but potentially destabilizing ac-
commodation strategy and a high-cost but disciplining deterrence strategy is likely to be present in 
any withdrawal process from an international institution. At the same time, the relative importance 
of this reinforcement mechanism will depend on the withdrawing state’s need for continued co-
operation with the institution and thus its relative bargaining power.6  
The greater the concerns among governments in the remaining member states of the institution 
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about possible encouragement effects of an accommodating strategy, the more they should sup-
port the high-cost deterrence strategy in an explicit effort to counteract imitation demands by 
populist parties in other countries of the institution. As a result, we should see strong internal 
alignment of policy goals between the remaining member states and the international institution 
itself, especially in countries where mainstream parties make up the government. Moreover, we 
would expect politicians from individual countries to speak and act with a focus on long-term 
integrity of the institution rather than with a focus on short-term national interests. Moreover, this 
effect should be particularly strong, if populist parties are serious challengers to established main-
stream parties in these other states. In other words, the greater the danger from encouragement 
effects, the stronger should the institution strive to push for a deterrence case. 
3   Brexit as an Empirical Case  
We investigate our theoretical predictions by examining how populist parties in the EU’s remaining 
member states responded to Brexit – the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union. Such a 
national withdrawal from the EU is a policy goal that strongly resonates with many nationalist 
populist parties in Europe. The case of Brexit is particularly suitable to test our argument because 
it provides a clear precedent in the sense that it is a policy that has featured prominently in populist 
discourse, but has never actually been implemented. In combination with the high visibility of the 
Brexit process and the relatively large number of populist eurosceptic parties throughout the Con-
tinent,7 this provides a strong learning environment.  
     The Brexit negotiations also offer considerable variation across time in terms of generating 
both encouraging and deterring information. Initially, the Brexit referendum proved to many that 
leaving the EU is possible. More than four years since the referendum, however, the Brexit process 
has generated considerable new information that allows observers to update this positive initial 
assessments and learn about the feasibility of leading this process to a success. The Brexiteers have 
to date achieved very little in the way of ‘taking back control’ as their initial slogan went.  
For example, two of the key promises of the Brexiteers were, a) to invest the money saved by 
no longer contributing to the EU budget into the National Health Service (NHS), and b) to use 
the newly gained independence from EU procedures to negotiate trade agreements tailored to best 
suit Britain’s interests. However, the estimated economic costs of Brexit thus far have already 
reached the level of the UK’s total contributions to the EU budget over the entire period since its 
accession in 1973 (McCarthy 2020). Likewise, there is currently no trade deal with any of the UK’s 
major trade partners anywhere in sight. Much to the contrary of the tailored trade agreements that 
were announced, the UK will in all likelihood fall back to WTO trade rules by the end of 2020 – 
both with the EU and with any country that has a trade agreement with the EU but has not yet 
negotiated one with the UK. On top of this, Brexit has posed threats to UK’s internal peace and 
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territorial integrity by raising the Irish-Irish border question (which was solved as British Premier 
Johnson accepted an internal maritime border between Northern Ireland and Great Britain) and 
by reinvigorating the Scottish independence movement.   
     According to our theory, these negative experiences on the side of the UK should entail a 
learning process across the EU and, in particular, within European populist challenger parties. In 
fact, the events on the British Isles may serve as a warning especially to those who tend to hold 
nationalist views and wish for a strong national state. We therefore expect the new evidence from 
the British precedent expect to counterbalance the ease with which populist eurosceptic parties 
can position themselves as viable alternatives to the pro-European mainstream. As a result, this 
should have a self-stabilizing effect on the Union.  
     In the context of the accommodation dilemma, we furthermore argue that the British government 
strongly misread the EU’s incentives to grant the UK those concessions that might actually have 
made life for the UK outside the EU an attractive alternative to continued membership. The UK 
government noticed that the EU and its remaining member states had clear economic incentives 
to accept the UK’s withdrawal while maintaining all economic links it could to minimize the eco-
nomic costs of Brexit. For example, Whitehall was confident that Germany would be unwilling to 
give up unrestricted access to the UK market for its well-connected and vocal automotive indus-
try.8 However, the pro-Brexit leadership in the UK misjudged the EU’s incentive to discourage 
imitation effects in other member states by accepting the costs of denying the UK an attractive 
exit from the Union. Especially in the light of populists having gained momentum throughout the 
remaining EU member states, the EU’s leaning in this question was much more on the hard side 
than the Brexiteers anticipated. Misreading these incentives was one of many aspects through 
which the proponents of the British exit in the UK demonstrated that they are not able to deliver 
on their promises.  
The Brexit negotiations revealed these discrepancies and provided evidence about the difficul-
ties associated with withdrawing from a deeply integrated international institution as the EU. This 
is especially true since the predominant trend over the past decades has always pointed toward 
deeper integration. As a result, there is little evidence on the prospects of a move toward de-
globalization in the early twenty-first century. This lack of evidence has made it comparatively easy 
for populist challenger parties to simply claim that the unseen re-nationalized counterfactual world 
is the better alternative. In this context, Brexit events now provide a precedent that informs the 
populist disintegration discourse across Europe. We now proceed to laying out our empirical strat-
egy to systematically test our argument.   
4   Data and Empirical Strategy 
The core of our empirical approach is based on a novel dataset of integration and disintegration 
statements and events across European countries. Our data is based on an extensive processing of 
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national print media reporting and contain detailed calendar-day-specific information on the dis-
course, actions, interactions, and stated intentions of politicians from both populist challenger 
parties and established political parties concerning questions of international and European inte-
gration.  
     These news data allow us to track how the statements, positions, and (in the case of government 
participation) actions of politicians and parties vary over time. We then link these trends to tem-
poral information on the UK’s Brexit experience that captures the essence of new incoming infor-
mation about the success of Brexit (and by extension the likelihood of success of national with-
drawals from the EU elsewhere). We measure the success of the UK’s Brexit experience based on 
both exchange rate data and human assessments. Overlaying the changes in party positions and 
political statements with information on the UK’s Brexit experience then allows us to demonstrate 
that the observed co-movements are consistent with our argument. Additional qualitative evidence 
on the underlying reasoning and assessments of political actors, allows us to corroborate the causal 
nature of our observed relationships.  
 
Mapping political trends: A media-based dataset of integration-disintegration statements and events 
To compile our data, we proceed in several steps roughly following the strategy developed by 
Martini (2020a, 2020b). First, we select a set of EU member states to focus on in our analysis. We 
base our selection on two criteria, which we expect on theoretical grounds to condition both pop-
ulist parties as well as strategic government responses across countries.  
 
Figure 1: Case Selection – Maximizing Cross-national Variation in Dimensions of Theoretical Interest   
 
 
Notes: EU27 refers to the member states remaining in the EU post-Brexit.  
 
The first criterion concerns a country’s relative economic size compared to EU as a whole. We 
operationalize this criterion by computing each EU country’s 2012-2019 average GDP as a per-
centage of  the average EU-27 GDP over the same time period (World Bank 2020). This measure 
proxies a country’s relative economic and – by extension – political importance within the EU, 
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and hence its bargaining power vis-à-vis the Union, which is likely to moderate both pressures to 
Leave from populist challenger parties and behavior toward the UK from established parties and 
government officials.  
The second criterion is a country’s trade exposure toward the UK. This criterion proxies a 
country’s vulnerability to the short term economic costs of Brexit and might thus affect its stance 
on the accommodation/non-accommodation trade-off. We measure trade exposure as a country’s 
exports to the UK as a percentage of the country’s total exports using aggregate trade data from 
UN Comtrade (2020) and averages for the 2012-2019 period. Figure 1 places the EU-27 countries 
in this two-dimensional space. To maximize variation across the two dimensions, we initially focus 
on Austria, Germany, and Ireland as country case for closer examination. 10  
     For each of these country cases, we next select a set of three to four major newspapers for each 
country as a starting point for our media analysis. Our goal is to select the largest (in terms of 
circulation) nation-wide appearing dailies, which have a higher reporting throughput and tend to 
focus more on shorter factual reporting of events rather than on in-depth opinion and analysis 
than more infrequently appearing outlets such as weekly and monthly publications, while at the 
same time to achieve a relatively balanced distribution in terms of the papers’ political leaning.11 
These qualities line up best with our objective to compile a political events dataset as dailies allow 
us to precisely pinpoint the dates of events while simultaneously maximizing the frequency of 
relevant factual reports. Besides circulation numbers and political leaning, our newspaper selection 
also reflects some availability constraints. We include both quality newspapers and tabloids to 
cover a broad range of coverage. Our analyses are based on Der Standard, die Presse, and Kurier for 
Austria, BILD, Die Welt, Süddeutsche Zeitung and Handelsblatt for Germany, and Irish Daily Mail, the 
Irish Independent, and The Irish Times for Ireland (see Table A1 in the appendix for more details).  
     Third, for all newspapers in our selection we identify the articles that are relevant to our 
purpose of building a news dataset on (dis-)integration related statements and events. To this end, 
we ran a full text search on the entire news content of each outlet published between 1 January 
2012 until 1 February 2020. Our dataset thus spans the period before Brexit became a salient issue 
until the UK’s exit from the European Union . Our search employs a range of Boolean search 
term combinations with the aim of identifying articles related to 1) Brexit and the UK’s withdrawal 
from the EU including reporting of what national populist and mainstream politicians say and do 
in this context, 2) the target country’s own domestic integration-disintegration discourse including 
statements by populist challenger parties toward reform of or withdrawal from the EU and estab-
lished party reactions to such statements, and 3) euroscepticism and nationalist/populist sentiment 
and discourse in the target country more generally. Table A2 in the appendix contains the English 
language search terms used in our procedure.12 Overall, our search produced a news corpus con-
sisting of 39,460 articles (Austria = 7525, Germany = 10476, Ireland = 21459).13  
                                                          
10  See the data section below for a detailed description of data sources underlying Figure 1. Future iterations of 
this paper will include an expanded set of countries. 
11   We also exclude outlets that appear only regionally. 
12  In the actual implementation all search terms are translated in the respective national language. 
13  It is interesting to note the high correlation of .97 between a country’s trade exposure to the UK and the number 
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We then zoom in further and identify relevant passages within our set of articles. Because we 
are seeking to compile data based on statements and actions of political elites, our primary interest 
is in finding passages that quote or paraphrase statements by these elites or describe their activities. 
To do this, we use a regular expressions-based search algorithm to identify the names of political 
leaders and parties in our articles and annotate any sentence that contains a reference to at least 
one of these actors. Specifically, we focus on the following sets of actors:  
 
 1. National politicians in Austria, Germany, and Ireland that have a role in government 
and/or are members of parliament (A).  
 
  National parties in Austria, Germany, and Ireland that are represented in parliament 
and spokespeople of these parties beyond those in government and parliament (B). 
 
 2. UK politicians that have a role in government and/or are members of parliament (A).  
  UK parties that are represented in parliament and spokespeople of these parties be-
yond those in government and parliament (B). 
 
 3. EU leadership personnel (Brexit lead negotiator Michel Barnier as well as the respective 
presidents of the European Parliament, the European Council, and the European 
Commission). 
 
 4. Challenger parties and populist, eurosceptic actors that are not represented in national par-
liaments but nonetheless shape the domestic national discourse (i.e., Nigel Farage 
and his Brexit Party in the UK or the AfD in Germany before entering Parliament). 
 
 
To identify politicians names in our countries of interest (1.A and 2.A), we rely on data on Parlia-
mentarians during the 2012-2020 period from the ‘EveryPolitician’ project (mySociety 2020). We 
complement these data with data from the CIA “Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members” directory 
(CIA 2020). Because the ‘EveryPolitician’ data also lists parliamentarians’ party affiliations, we can 
identify all national parties represented in parliament  throughout the 2012-2020 period (1.B and 
2.B) from these data as well. Our ‘regular expressions’ procedure includes common synonyms for 
parties to avoid missing relevant references.14 Our approach allows us to quickly and reliably iden-
tify the core passages of news reporting on integration-disintegration related statements and ac-
tions by political elites in the most widely read national outlets.  
     In order to translate the information in these text passages into quantitative data, we now switch 
from automated text processing to human-based coding. This choice is motivated by several con-
siderations. First, we aim to extract very detailed, sentence-level information along multiple dimen-
sions of interest. This is a very challenging task to perform computationally because it cannot rely 
                                                          
of Brexit-related articles per country in our corpus. This suggests that trade exposure strongly affects the quan-
tity of discourse about Brexit in a country. On the content of this discourse, see the analysis below.    
14  For example, for the British Conservatives, we employ the search terms “Conservative*”, which finds “Con-
servatives”, “Conservative Party”, etc. as well as “Tory”, and “Tories”. We also use both common abbreviations 
of party names as well as conventional long forms. 
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on word or phrase distributions that are typically employed in document-level natural language 
processing (NLP) applications and instead requires actual interpretation of textual information. 
Second, we are interested in extracting information that is oftentimes not explicitly stated – though 
easily recognizable by humans – such as actors’ implied intentions or the warmth of their relations.  
Third, in news text the reader often needs some context to identify whether a sentence contains 
the statement of a politician or an interpretation of the journalist. That is, identifying the primary 
actor – one of our core objectives – is not easily automated and does very often not coincide with 
the noun phrase of a sentence that is often used in NLP tasks to identify the subject. Fourth, we 
are interested in the political context in which a statement is made, which requires taking the in-
formation of surrounding sentences or article headings into account. Lastly, our preselection pro-
cedure oftentimes selects more than one sentence from an article and it is thus necessary to choose 
the key information of interest from this preselection.  
     In coding our pre-selected text passages, we follow a partial sampling strategy to maximize the 
information density and reliability of our data while minimizing time requirements and excessive 
duplications. Since one of our primary interests lies in the discourse of populist challenger parties,15 
which are typically a) smaller in terms of size and representation relative to established parties, and 
b) mostly not in government, these parties are underrepresented in our corpus. To compensate 
for this, we select all articles with challenger party references for our coding procedure. In contrast, 
we select a random sample of articles with references to established parties and politicians.16 This 
procedure results in an preliminary dataset that contains 1,272 detailed, multi-dimensional state-
ment and event relationships.  
     Our coding scheme is based on six categorical variables, each of which captures a different 
dimension of a reported event (see Table 1). For each event, we code who the actor (subject) is 
and who this actor targets in her speech or actions (object), using the categories established na-
tional parties,17 national populist parties, UK parties, EU officials and institutions, and the media 
(i.e., journalists). We then ode in which context  (context) this interaction takes place. In our data, 
the primary context is Brexit, which is unsurprising given our article selection procedure, yet con-
texts such as immigration/refugees, the Euro-crisis, EU reform more generally, or elections are 
also referenced. Looking at the explicit or implicit relationship between actor and target, we code 
a warmth measure (warmth) that takes the values warm, neutral, and cold. Finally, we code the 
                                                          
15  For our purposes, we define populist challenger parties as anti-globalist, eurosceptic parties, for which re-na-
tionalization and/or EU-reform are key programmatic objectives. Specifically, we focus on the following parties 
in our current sample: Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany; Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) in 
Austria; and People before Profit (BPB) and Independents for Change (I4C) in Ireland.   
16  Specifically, we opt for 750 established party articles per country. Together with our population of challenger 
party articles, this yields on average of somewhat above 1000 articles per country to code. 
17  Note that we do not distinguish between individual parties in our coding but include all established national 
parties in the ‘established party’ category. This choice is made primarily for two reasons. First, there is a clear 
focus on government leaders (cabinet members) in the media reports, while members of the opposition are 
cited much less frequently so that there is little to be gained by recording the specific party affiliation of the 
occasional opposition speaker. Second, and reinforcing the previous point, there is very little disagreement 
among established party politicians in the countries we analyze concerning their positions towards either Brexit 
or the EU more generally.  
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action the actor performs (action) and the actor’s explicit or implicit intention (goal). These varia-
bles are the most flexible and take on a larger number of categories, most of which are related 
either to questions of EU integration and reform or to diplomatic efforts to handle the Brexit 
negotiations. Table A4 in the appendix contains a detailed overview of our data including a listing 
of the most important variable values across our six variables and the frequencies with which these 
values occur in the data. Taken together, the six variables capture the essence of the reported event 
in an abstracted but tangible form. 
 
Table 1: Coding Scheme – Overview 
Variable Explanation  Example 1 Example 2 Example 3 
Subject  The speaker or actor – the person or entity mak-







Object  The object of statement or action – the person 
or entity that is spoken about or the target of the 
action. 
 EU UK EU 
Context  The policy context in which the speaker’s state-
ment or action takes place. 
 Brexit  Brexit Challenger 
party 
Warmth  The (explicit or implicit) friendliness of the sub-
ject’s relation to the object. 
 Cold Neutral Warm 
Action  Speaker’s (cited) action or type of statement.  Demand Offer Worry 
Goal   Speaker’s (explicit or implicit) policy goal.  Leave Delay EU unity 
 
Notes: See Table A4 for a more detailed description of the coding scheme and an overview of variable values and their frequencies.  
 
In the analyses below we primarily focus on the subject-object pair ‘Challenger party – EU’ to estab-
lish our core result but subsequently investigate a range of other constellations to unpack the un-
derlying mechanisms. 
 
Primary explanatory variable: Evaluation of the UK’s Brexit success 
Our primary interest is in examining whether learning from the empirical precedent of Brexit af-
fects populist and integration-sceptic pressures from challenger parties in European countries out-
side the UK. To investigate whether a positive Brexit-experience encourages, whether a negative 
experience deters support for similar populist and eurosceptic policies in the other EU member 
states, we thus need information of how Brexit is going for the UK at any point in time. To quan-
titatively assess the UK’s Brexit experience across time, we rely on two different strategies: an 
‘objective’ market-based strategy using the British Pound exchange rate and a more ‘subjective’ 
strategy based on a human sentiment coding of key events. These measures of the quality of the 
Brexit experience are strongly correlated (corr = .85).  
Our objective measure is based on the daily spot exchange rate of the British Pound against a 
basket of major currencies (Euro, US Dollar, Swiss Franc, and Japanese Yen).18 With this strategy, 
                                                          
18  Exchange rate data come from the Bank of England and are available here. 
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we exploit the fact that foreign exchange markets constantly process and condense large amounts 
of information for profit maximization purposes and thus have an inherent incentive for accuracy 
given available knowledge. The Pound exchange rate thus serves as an aggregate market-based 
measure of trust into the UK’s current and future prospects by economic actors based on political 
and economic developments (Bernhard and Leblang 2002). Figure 2 (left panel) shows the devel-
opment of the Pound exchange rate since January 2012. The dark blue lines is the exchange rate 
against the basket (the red dotted line captures our cumulative learning measure, which we derive 
from this data and discuss further below).  
 
Figure 2: How well is Brexit going? Quantifying the Brexit experience 
 
Notes: The left panel plots the daily spot exchange rate of the British Pound against a basket of major currencies (Euro, US Dollar, 
Swiss Franc, and Japanese Yen) as a market-based measure of trust into the UK’s current and future prospects. The dark blue lines 
is the exchange rate against the basket. The light blue lines indicate the exchange rates against the individual currencies. The right 
panel shows a (loess-smoothed) hand-coded measure of how well Brexit is going for the UK. The overlaid exchange rate data 
demonstrates considerable alignment between the two measures (corr = .85). See Table A3 for the underlying events data. Dashed 
vertical lines indicate relevant events. The red dotted lines capture the 1.5 year rearward-looking moving averages of the respective 
measures to capture memory effects (see text for details).   
 
The graph shows that foreign exchange markets grew increasingly optimistic about the UK’s pro-
spects between 2012 and 2015. During this period, the Tories included the referendum in their 
election manifesto and won the 2015 national election in part on that basis and Prime Minister 
David Cameron managed to secure concessions on immigration concerning the UK’s EU mem-
bership obligations from the EU following the election in early 2016. However, a few months 
before the Brexit referendum, the Pound began to slip, possibly in response to rising uncertainty 
as opinion polls showed increasing support for a ‘Leave’ outcome. The Leave-victory in the June 
2016 Brexit referendum then led to a significant fall in the exchange rate. The referendum outcome 
not only contradicted Cameron’s expressly advocated vote recommendation. It also meant that 
the concessions obtained from the EU for membership reform in the shadow of the referendum 
became obsolete while plunging the UK into a highly uncertain situation. The referendum thus 
marks the failure of Cameron’s high-risk negotiation strategy and the beginning of the actual Brexit 
phase. Although market confidence recovered slightly in the first two years after the referendum, 
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the Pound exchange-rate has remained below its pre-referendum value ever since. Moreover, the 
difficulties of passing the withdrawal agreement are reflected in a volatile and depreciating ex-
change rate. Britain’s actual exit from the EU on 31 January 2020 did not manage to turn around 
this trend. 
     As a second, subjective measure, we rely on a qualitative hand-coded assessment by the authors 
of how well Brexit is going for the UK, shown as a loess-smoothed trend line (blue) of the hand-
coded data in Figure 2 (right panel). In coding individual events, we assign values on a seven point 
scales from -3 for very negative to +3 for very positive events. Positive events are defined as 
developments that – from a perspective of the UK government – align with or are helpful for 
achieving stated sovereignty-related policy goals (e.g., EU reform under Cameron, Brexit under 
May and Johnson). Negative events are developments that hinder or contradict such goals. The 
coding starts from a neutral sentiment (i.e., a value of 0) in the pre-Brexit phase in 2012 and then 
initially becomes increasingly positive, before it turns significantly more negative during the Brexit 
referendum. In the post-referendum period, the measure fluctuates with individual events but gen-
erally remains on a low level throughout the post-2016 period. This is because the UK has never 
managed to actively shape the negotiation process to its advantage and has instead seen consider-
able internal divisions and disagreements over the right course of action. This, in turn, further 
weakened the UK’s bargaining position toward the EU (and other relevant players such as the US). 
The entire underlying events descriptions and their associated sentiment coding can be found in 
the appendix below in Table A3.  
     Our actual measures of interest are derived from these measures in a further step. Both, the 
exchange rate data and our human-coded data assess the degree to which individual events are posi-
tive or negative from a UK perspective. However, to approximate an answer to the conceptual 
question of how well Brexit is going for the UK overall, we need to also take the history of past 
events into account. Intuitively, outside observers – including populist European challenger parties 
– will not base their evaluations of the UK’s experience only on the most recent data point. Rather, 
they will form their assessments on the basis accumulated information from of the entire history 
events that is continuously updated as new events unfold. We thus want a dynamic cumulative 
measure that aggregates the history of events (i.e., allows for memory effects) while taking the 
latest developments into account. To this end, we compute a rearward-looking moving average of 
our raw data for the previous 1.5 years for any given date. The variables Brexit evaluation (X-rate) 
and Brexit evaluation (hand-coded) reported in Tables 1 and 2 are based on these data.19  
     The red dotted lines in both panels of Figure 2 descriptively show these moving averages for 
both our data series. It can be seen that these measures smooth out the short-term volatilities of 
the data as they aggregate current and past events to form a more informed measure based on a 
more extensive set of available information. For example, in mid-2016, the ‘Leave’ vote was an 
outcome that introduced severe uncertainty and was at odds with the UK government’s intentions, 
which is why the assessments in both our data series fall sharply around that date. However, at the 
time it was far from clear that this would result in a painful and largely unsuccessful negotiation 
                                                          
19  Our results are insensitive to different choices of window width for the calculation of the moving average. 
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marathon from a UK perspective. In 2016, it was still well conceivable that UK might negotiate 
an advantageous exit deal – especially against the backdrop of Cameron’s success in obtaining EU 
concessions with regard to EU membership obligations. It only gradually became clear that this 
possibility was increasingly unlikely to materialize.   
 
Other explanatory variables 
Our empirical analysis takes several other factors into account. The primary variables of interest 
on the country-level (cross-sectional variation) are a country’s bargaining power relative to the EU 
and its exposure to the fallout from Brexit, that is the same variables on which we based our case 
selection is based. In addition to these cross-sectional measures, we investigate several dynamic 
factors other than our  Brexit statements and actions data described above that might affect ob-
servers’ assessments of European integration. One set of these variables concerns election timing. 
On the one hand, we consider the effect of the 2019 European parliament elections that took place 
on May 26. To assess the effect the EP elections we define a dummy variable European Parliament 
elections (run up) that takes a value of 1 in the six months that precede the EP elections to capture 
the associated election campaigns, and 0 otherwise. Equivalently, we define a second variable Na-
tional elections (run up) for the six-month periods preceding national elections, a variable that varies 
across countries.20 
     We also explore the effect of the immediate Brexit shock (week after referendum). As the variable 
name suggests, this is a dummy that takes a value of 1 for all dates in the week immediately fol-
lowing the ‘Leave’ vote in the UK on 23 June 2016, and 0 otherwise. Lastly, we consider the impact 
of a country holding the Presidency of the Council of the EU, which rotates among countries on 
a biannual basis. Again, this variable, EU presidency (incumbency effect), is coded as a dummy that takes 
a value of 1 for all dates during Austria’s presidency between July-December 2018, and 0 otherwise.  
5   Analysis and Results 
How does the UK’s Brexit experience affect the policy positions and aggressiveness of demands 
of populist and eurosceptic challenger parties in Europe? Our theoretical argument suggests that 
the information produced by Brexit – the largest and most wide-ranging withdrawal process from 
an international institution in (recent) history – should have a considerable impact on populist 
rhetoric. To test this argument, we first examine whether and how the Brexit process is correlated 
with the policy positions of challenger parties. In support of the argument, we find that  the ag-
gressiveness of demands toward the EU brought forward by populist challenger parties in our 
sample increases with a more positive Brexit experience, but becomes more muted when Brexit is 
going badly. We then zoom into the mechanisms of this process and examine how the EU-27’s 
                                                          
20  The relevant election dates within our period of analysis are 15 October 2017 and 29 September 2019 for 
Austria, 24 September 2017 for Germany, and 26 February as well as 8 February 2020 for Ireland. 
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and the UK’s negotiation positions and negotiation accomplishments were perceived by estab-
lished and by challenger parties. 
 
Learning from Brexit: Challenger party positions toward the EU over time 
Do the ups and downs of the Brexit process influence how aggressively eurosceptics in other 
EU countries speak about the EU? To examine this question, we analyze the stated policy positions 
of populist challenger parties vis-à-vis the EU (that is, we slice our data to the subset Subject = 
Challenger party, Object = EU) and recode challenger parties’ goals into four categories according to 
the aggressiveness of their policy stance regarding European integration: 0 = Status quo (state-
ments that express explicit content with the current depth of EU integration and/or oppose fur-
ther integration beyond the current status quo), 1 = Reform (i.e., calls for a reform of the EU 
toward re-nationalization), 2 = Reform or leave (explicit leave demands, if no sufficient reform is 
undertaken), 3 = Leave (demands for leaving that see no hope in reforms). Thus, higher values 
indicate more extreme disintegrative demands and policy positions.  
We begin with a descriptive analysis, but also provide statistical evidence below. The panels of 
Figure 3 plots the sixty stated policy positions of populist challenger parties vis-à-vis the EU we 
identified in our media analysis. It shows the development of challenger parties’ policy positions 
towards the EU over time in the aggregate and for individual countries. Black lines and shaded 
gray areas are loess estimates with 95% confidence intervals to visualize predominant time trends. 
The dashed vertical lines indicate relevant context events.  
Several trends are apparent from Figure 3. First, the most extreme demands from European 
challenger parties toward EU integration are made immediately after Brexit referendum’s ‘Leave’ 
outcome was announced. This trend is discernible both in the aggregate data as well as in any of 
the individual country panels. For example, in Germany, Beatrix von Storch, AfD Representative 
in the European Parliament, declared that the European Project “has failed” and stated that she 
“wept with joy” at the news of the British ‘Leave’ vote. Another prominent AfD politician, Björn 
Höcke, explicitly demanded “a referendum on whether Germany should remain in the EU” 
(Kamann, 2016). In Austria, the FPÖ’s candidate for 2016 Austrian presidential election, Norbert 
Hofer, explicitly welcomed the Brexit outcome and his party intensified calls for a similar referen-
dum in Austria, if no significant reform of the EU were forthcoming. It also hosted a meeting of 
European rightwing politicians including France’s Marine Le Pen to discuss potential cooperation 
among anti-European forces following Brexit (Nowak and Götz 2016). In Ireland, where euro-
sceptic views are traditionally held among the left rather than the right, the referendum outcome 
also sparked more aggressive demands. People Before Profit (PBP) MP Richard Boyd Barrett 
brought up a possible “Irexit”, saying the UK’s ‘Leave’ vote draws into question Ireland’s own 
role in the EU. The party said that in the event of Brexit, it would campaign for Ireland to leave 
the EU as well, adding: “We favour the break-up of the current structures of the EU on left-wing 
grounds” (Michael, 2016). PBP MP Paul Murphy reiterated this stance by saying that while it was 
currently not a “foreground” issue, if a referendum were held, PBP would be in support of ‘Leave’ 
(McGee, 2016). Taken together, this evidence suggests that the Brexit referendum initially had a 
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considerable encouragement effect in the sense that it demonstrated that leaving the European 
Union really was a viable option rather than a distant fantasy. This finding is fully in line with our 
theoretical expectations.  
 
Figure 3: European Challenger Parties – Stated Positions toward the EU over Time  
 
Notes: Points describe stated policy positions (i.e., goals) as reported in national newspapers (Levels: 0 = Status quo, 1 = Reform, 2 
= Leave unless Reform, 3 = Leave). Positions are jittered for better visibility. Lines and shaded areas are loess estimates with 95% 
confidence intervals to visualize dominant time trends. Dashed vertical lines indicate relevant events. Party abbreviations: AfD = 
Alternative für Deutschland; FPÖ = Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs; BPB = People before Profit, I4C = Independents for Change.  
 
Secondly, while there is a clear trend toward more extreme positions following the UK’s ‘Leave’ 
vote, there is also a clear increase in the variance of challenger party positions immediately after 
the Brexit referendum in June 2016. Although this pattern is most pronounced in Austria, where 
the entire range of positions can be found in mid-2016, the trend is more general: For all three 
countries in our data, there is no other point in time in our sample period at which populist party 
positions exhibit a comparable level of dispersion. The large variance is in part due to the larger 
quantity of political statements after the referendum. However, it also reflects internal debates and 
dissent about the way forward and the best course of action in the near future.  
The overall question that is debated, especially in Germany and Austria, is the degree to which 
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Brexit can serve as a direct role model for the respective national strategy. This suggests that the 
learning mechanism we propose plays a key role in shaping populist strategy and discourse in 
Europe. In Germany, the statements by Höcke and von Storch cited above are complemented by 
more cautious positions. The AfD candidate for the election to the House of Representatives in 
Berlin, Georg Pazderski, for example, said with regard to the Brexit referendum “it is a bad day 
for the cohesion within Europe”. In similar vein, AfD vice-president Alexander Gauland expressly 
opposed the idea of a referendum on Germany’s EU membership saying he would not want to 
“to launch a new campaign tomorrow”, and instead supported the idea of an EU organized as a 
“Europe of Fatherlands” (Kamann 2016). In Austria, too, cautionary voices complement more 
extreme demands. For instance, regional FPÖ head Manfred Haimbuchner opposed speculations 
about an exit of Austria from the EU and said that he could even imagine a deeper integration in 
some areas, such as the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (Die Presse, 2016).  
Third, there is a sharp drop in the aggressiveness of demands in the years following the Brexit 
referendum that coincide with the increasingly painful Brexit negotiations between the UK and 
the EU. The most extreme positions such as outright demands to exit the EU or to hold referen-
dums similar to the British one disappear entirely. Instead, there is a clearly visible trend towards 
a moderation of demands. For the most part demands now gravitate toward an acceptance of 
European integration coupled with calls for ‘reforms from within’. In Austria and Ireland populist 
party positions even include explicit statements of support for the status quo of European inte-
gration, such as the previously mentioned statements in support of European security cooperation 
or general support for European trade integration and the Single Market.  In Austria, Norbert 
Hofer moderated his stance toward a reform position as early as December 2016, saying: “I never 
welcomed the Brexit vote. I said that I assume that there will be new treaties within the EU because 
of Brexit. […] I think it would be necessary to consider how we can better organize the Union. I 
am convinced that the European project is not yet lost: with a subsidiary Union we can certainly 
move into a positive future” (Nowak and Götz 2016). FPÖ party head Heinz-Christian Strache 
stated his call for ‘reforms from within’ in fall 2017 by explicitly referencing the deterrent effect of 
the Brexit, saying he hoped that the “the right lessons” would be drawn from the “warning signal 
Brexit” (Die Presse 2017). The Austrian press has been particularly vocal about the FPÖ’s change 
of course. In June 2017, a year after the Brexit referendum, Die Presse writes “Statements concern-
ing a withdrawal from the Euro or the EU have become unpopular. This was one of the reasons 
why the FPÖ changed its European policy position during the presidential election campaign. 
Statements on the Öxit were reversed, and proposals for a new EU vote in Austria were no longer 
pursued. Leaving the EU is more unpopular than it has been for years” (Böhm 2017, also see: Der 
Standard, 2017). In early 2019, Der Standard puts it even more bluntly: “Öxit. This was to be pushed 
as often as possible. But the FPÖ doesn’t want to talk about it anymore because for years a large 
majority of Austrians have been in favor of remaining in the Union. Especially since the chaos 
surrounding Brexit, nobody seriously thinks about the option of an Öxit” (Oswald, 2019).  
In Ireland, in 2019, the Irish PBP MP Richard Boyd Barrett, who called for Irexit in 2016 said: 
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“We believe very strongly in Europe and internationalism but we have big criticisms of the Euro-
pean institutions” – a strong shift towards a reform stance (Kelly, 2019). The journalist adds that 
“The Brexit being pursued by the UK Tory party is not the same as the British withdrawal from 
the EU which People Before Profit supported three years ago” (Kelly, 2019). The Irish Independent 
similarly writes: “One key point of consensus [since Brexit] has been Ireland’s loyalty to the EU. 
Even traditionally Eurosceptic parties like Sinn Féin have made it clear that they consider contin-
uing EU membership vital to Ireland’s interests. […] The hard-left in Ireland has long been anti-
EU. From a more right-wing perspective, [party leaders] vocally endorsed the view that Ireland 
was ‘closer to Boston than Berlin’. […] Indeed, in late 2016 with the UK in a mess, the Boston 
option then became even less attractive when Donald Trump took the presidency. […] In any 
event, the extent to which the UK and US would ever have been partners for a country as small 
as Ireland was very questionable.” (McCrea 2018). The descriptive data and the statements of party 
officials and media commentary supports the argument that the UK’s chaotic Brexit experience in 
the UK is a primary driver of these trends toward moderation. These statements further point to 
the existence of a learning process on the side of political elites. Overall, our findings support our 
theoretical expectations about the moderation of populist statements in the face of discouraging 
or ‘deterring’ new information. 
Moreover, there is a general trend among challenger parties to simply talk less about the ques-
tion of European integration, especially in Germany and Ireland. In Austria, this trend is less pro-
nounced – largely due to the fact that the FPÖ is in government between late 2017 and mid-2019 
(in a coalition with the conservative ÖVP) and is thus present in the news more often as well as 
forced to publicly position itself on policy issues including EU policy. This finding is in line with 
our theoretical expectations about the quantity of populist statements.  
     Lastly, there is a visible effect of the 2019 European Parliament elections. In the run up to 
the elections, we generally observe a higher quantity of statements again as parties position them-
selves during the election campaign. We also see that the election campaign leads to some renewed 
intensification of demands. Yet in none of the countries in our sample do we see a recurrence to 
the levels of demands uttered in 2016 and for the most part populist demands remain well within 
the moderate reform camp, echoing evidence provided by van Kessel et al. (2020), who fail to find 
an uptick in support for EU-exit in eurosceptic parties’ election manifestoes. Only in Germany do 
we observe some demands for reforms in the shadow of a referendum threat (Reform or Leave) that 
are made during internal debates about the election strategy. However, the official AfD election 
manifesto ended up siding with the moderates and did not contain any reference to ‘Dexit’ sce-
narios. As one commentator put it: “they shy away from the devastating British example in the 
campaign” (Hoenig, 2019). The EP elections essentially force populist parties to publically position 
themselves on EU policy even though they might otherwise prefer to keep silent on this issue. For 
our purposes, the EP elections are useful because they allow us to elicit populist parties’ policy 
stances. The fact that we find a more moderate policy stance compared to mid-2016 even in elec-
tion times, where eurosceptic parties would under normal circumstances set themselves apart from 
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other parties by making their alternative policy position explicit, is further evidence for the deter-
rence mechanism we propose.     
Our descriptive data suggests that the Brexit process is correlated with the policy positions of 
challenger parties. The trends and patterns discernible in Figure 3 are also evident in a more sys-
tematic investigation. Table 2 presents the results of regression analyses of challenger parties’ state-
ments about the EU. It examines how the aggressiveness of these statements is related to our two 
quantitative measures of the UK’s Brexit success, and additional covariates described in section 3. 
The first three models are based on the objective measure of market sentiment about Brexit (the 
exchange rate measure), while models 4 through 6 are based on our hand-coded evaluation of 
Brexit events. Models 1 and 4 present the baseline results in a univariate regression setting. Models 
2 and 5 include all variables. Models 3 and 6 represent the most conservative estimates and include 
a full set of country and newspaper fixed effects to eliminate possible unobserved heterogeneity.  
 
Table 2: European Challenger Parties – Aggressiveness of Demands toward the EU  
 Brexit evaluation (exchange-rate)  Brexit evaluation (hand-coded) 
 baseline full full + FE  baseline full full + FE 
Intercept 
 
–4.638***   
(1.308) 
– 6.866***     
(1.383) 




(0.094)   
0.616***     
(0.160)     
0.652***     
(0.172)     
Brexit evaluation  
(X-rate) 
4.086***    
(0.936) 
5.379***  
(0.984)    
5.841***     
(0.995)     
    
Brexit evaluation  
(Hand-coded) 
    
0.338*** 
(0.081)    
0.482***     
(0.084)     
0.512***     
(0.086)     
European Parliament 
elections (run up) 
 
0.601*  
(0.244)   
0.570*      
(0.252)     
  
0.671**     
(0.245)     
0.636*      
(0.255)     




(0.242)   
0.183      
(0.262)     
  
0.212      
(0.238)     
0.155      
(0.260)     
Bargaining power rel. 
to EU (% of GDP) 
 
2.891* 
(1.230)    
   
3.061*      
(1.211)     
 
Trade exposure to-




(3.101)    
   
2.440      
(3.033)     
 
Germany   
0.570    
(0.410) 
   
0.631    
(0.408) 
Ireland   
0.351    
(0.420) 
   

















N 60 60 60  60 60 60 
R2 0.247 0.440 0.518  0.231 0.456 0.522 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the aggressiveness of challenger party demands toward the EU (Levels: 0 = Status quo, 1 = 
Reform, 2 = Leave unless Reform, 3 = Leave). Standard errors in parentheses. Fixed effect estimates not shown. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the .001, .01 and .05 levels, respectively. 
 
The analysis reveals a strongly positive and statistically significant relationship between the UK’s 
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Brexit experience and the aggressiveness of demands toward the EU brought forward by populist 
challenger party in our sample that holds across all specifications. The positive coefficient suggests 
that as long as Brexit appears to go well for the UK, populist challenger parties are encouraged to 
follow the UK’s example and equally advocate for their country’s exit from the EU or significant 
EU reform – a clear encouragement effect. As Brexit begins to look less and less successful, how-
ever, Brexit increasingly has a deterrence effect that leads challenger parties to tone down their 
demands and advocate for more moderate positions of the ‘reform from within’ variety. The anal-
ysis also suggests that this mechanism is substantively important. The R2 values of the univariate 
models 1 and 4 show that the Brexit evaluation measures alone explain almost 25 percent of the 
variation in populist party positions toward the EU.  
     Our results also confirm that challenger parties become more aggressive in the run-up to the 
European Parliament elections as suggested by Figure 3. However, this effect is smaller in both 
substantive and statistical terms than the effect of the Brexit trajectory. Somewhat surprisingly, 
national elections have no effect on challenger parties’ publicized policy stances about the EU. 
Moreover, challenger parties in countries with more bargaining power, that is a higher relative 
importance within the EU engage in a  more aggressive rhetoric vis-à-vis the EU, possibly be-
cause of greater hopes to be able secure better deals from the EU in the event of an exit and a 
higher expected feasibility of “going it alone” (De Vries 2018).  
 
Zooming in: EU Strategic Reasoning and Unity versus UK internal Dissent 
Our theoretical argument is based on the notion that Brexit presents a precedent that provides 
hitherto unavailable information on the prospects, desirability and feasibility of the withdrawal 
from an international institution. We hold that this information affects the demands and positions 
of populist eurosceptic parties in other European countries. In the previous section, we presented 
visual, statistical, and qualitative evidence in support of this claim by demonstrating that the state-
ments and demands of populist challenger parties underlie considerable encouragement and de-
terrence effects that originate from the UK’s Brexit experience.  
     Our theory also suggests the sequence in which these encouragement (first) and deterrence 
(second) effects should be observed and describes mechanisms that produce this sequence: First, 
because populists tend to capitalize on vague promises and diffuse fears rather than actual solu-
tions to existing problems, we expect the information generated from populists moving into gov-
ernment to generally point into a deterring direction as populist governments struggle to deliver 
on the promises they made in election times. In the British case, these tendencies are visible, for 
instance, in the hardline stance of many Brexiteers, stubborn statements about ‘Brexit means 
Brexit’, and the selection of ministers based primarily on their devotion to ‘Leave’ (e.g., Blanchard 
2019, Mardell 2016). These positions have had the additional effect of causing considerable inter-
nal dissent – within government as well as between government and parliament. This weakened 
the UK’s ability to actually manage the Brexit process and undermined its bargaining position vis-
à-vis the EU.  
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     These problems were further reinforced by the strategic incentives of the EU. Once the with-
drawal process was triggered and the initial encouragement effect produced, the EU had incentives 
to suppress and, ideally, revert such encouragement effects. In this sense, the UK’s withdrawal 
experience is not simply the result of exogenous circumstances, but amplified by the fact that the 
EU has incentives to actively push for a deterrent rather than an encouragement precedent to fend 
off further threats to its structural integrity. Phrased in the context of the accommodation dilemma, 
the EU’s strategy goes well beyond the goal of minimizing immediate withdrawal costs by allowing 
a smooth transition of the UK out of the Union.  
     We now investigate this logic in greater detail. We first focus on the EU’s incentives and nego-
tiation strategy. We then discuss how the differential abilities of the EU and the UK to manage 
the Brexit process ultimately contributed to UK’s chaotic Brexit experience – thus closing the loop 
to the moderating effects of the ‘Brexit precedent’ on populist disintegration demands.  
     We begin by documenting one key feature of the EU’s and it’s member states’ reaction to Brexit 
– a consistent internal cohesion and alignment of policy goals. This unity overwhelmingly brushed 
aside national interests in favor of a common position and allowed the EU to enter the Brexit 
negotiations from a position of strength. Figure 4 demonstrates this cohesion graphically (here, we 
slice our data to the subset Subject = Established party, Object = EU). The figure plots the warmth of 
statements (warm = 1, neutral = 0, cold = –1) by national politicians from established parties 
toward the EU over time. It shows that support for the EU remains consistently high and only 
fluctuates around or above the top quartile.21 The strong EU support among the countries in our 
selection is especially apparent when compared to Figure A1 in the appendix, which plots the 
warmth of statements toward the UK over time (i.e., Subject = Established party, Object = UK).  
 
Figure 4: Established Parties and Governments – Warmth of Statements about the EU over Time  
                                                          
21  In fact, the largest dips in warmth toward the EU that can be seen in Figure 4 are unrelated to Brexit. For 
Germany the lowest dip is due to the Euro-crisis and the Greek bailout question in 2015. For Austria, we see a 
strong effect of the 2017 national elections, where the election campaign was dominated by immigration issues. 




Notes: Points describe the warmth of statements reported in national newspapers, ranging from –1 (negative) to +1 (positive). Posi-
tions are averaged by month jittered for better visibility. Lines and shaded areas are loess estimates with 95% confidence intervals 
to visualize dominant time trends. Dashed vertical lines indicate relevant events. Letters indicate the policy context: b = Brexit, r = 
refugees and immigration, e = Euro-crisis, t = tax policy, c = challenger parties, v = elections/voting, $ = EU budget, E = EU generally. 
 
Germany as a core EU country overall shows highest levels of pro-EU statements. As we docu-
ment below, Germany took a particularly active role in the early European response toward Brexit 
as can be seen from the strongly supportive stance between mid-2016 and throughout 2017. The 
dip in warmth just around the Brexit referendum stems from calls for caution by German officials 
with regard to the further European strategy in the ace of the ‘Brexit shock’.  
Table 3 examines this relationship statistically. Columns 1 to 3 examines statements made with 
reference to Brexit (Context = Brexit), whereas columns 4-6 considers mainstream parties’ overall 
discourse about Brexit. With regard to Brexit, the analysis shows little movement of warmth to-
ward the EU over time or across countries. This reflects the consistently high national EU support. 
We only see slight cool downs in the run-up of national elections and in relation to Austria’s EU 
presidency (due to government participation of the FPÖ at the time).  
     The picture looks somewhat more dynamic when considering all statements toward the EU 
(Context = all). We again see the cooling effect of national elections. However, we also see a pro-
EU stance of established parties in European Parliament elections (for similar results, see: Schulte-
Cloos 2018). The more pronounced election coefficients compared to the Brexit-only sample are 
likely due to the fact that Brexit is less of an election relevant topic compared to questions like 
immigration or EU finances.22 The results further reaffirm the strong pro-EU position of Germany 
captured in the Bargaining power coefficient as well as the dampening effect of the Brexit shock 
immediately after the ‘Leave’ vote. The positive coefficient estimates on our Brexit evaluation 
measures indicate that, overall, warmth toward the EU tends to decline as the UK’s Brexit experi-
ence becomes more negative and the encouragement effect of Brexit therefore weakens. This re-
sults is primarily driven by an upcoming reform debate in the EU that seeks to draw lessons from 
                                                          
22  It is interesting to note that national and EP elections move established parties’ EU-related statements in op-
posite directions. This is likely due to the electoral pressure generated by eurosceptic challenger parties in the 
national context that plays less of a role in the EP setting where a party’s stance on the EU is at the core of the 
electoral competition.  
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Brexit and its underlying causes such as immigration. The fact that these self-critical debates arise 
when the most immediate risk of encouragement and contagion is mitigated, however, is only the 
mirror image of the fact that European unity is highest at the time of greatest need for internal 
cohesion and swift common action.  
 
Table 3: Established European Parties – Warmth of Statements about the EU 
 Brexit-related statements  All EU-related statements 
 full full full + FE  full full full + FE 
Intercept 
 
1.142      
(0.828) 
0.586***     
(0.113) 
0.634***     
(0.087)      
 
–1.356**     
(0.412)     
0.487***      
(0.043)     
0.540***      
(0.046)     
Brexit evaluation  
(X-rate) 
–0.409      
(0.578) 
   
1.326***     
(0.297)   
  
Brexit evaluation  
(Hand-coded) 
 
–0.072      
(0.051) 
–0.095      
(0.055)     
  
0.125***     
(0.025)      
0.109***      




–0.174      
(0.110)     
–0.147      
(0.108)     
–0.122      
(0.134)     
 
–0.310**     
(0.095)     
–0.318***    
(0.094)     
–0.302**      
(0.107)     
European Parliament 
elections (run up) 
–0.137      
(0.119)     
–0.214      
(0.130)     
–0.253      
(0.134)     
 
0.166*      
(0.071)      
0.218**      
(0.074)      
0.187*      
(0.078)      
National elections  
(run up) 
–0.166      
(0.083)     
–0.169*      
(0.081)     
–0.188*      
(0.085)    
 
–0.193***    
(0.048)     
–0.208***    
(0.048)     
–0.220***      
(0.051)     
EU presidency (incum-
bency effect) 
–0.311*     
(0.140)     
–0.392**     
(0.147)     
–0.453**     
(0.153)  
 
0.103      
(0.074)      
0.139      
(0.076)      
0.106      
(0.079)      
Bargaining power rel. to 
EU (% of GDP) 
0.505      
(0.411)     
0.556      
(0.404)      
  
0.551*      
(0.251)      
0.579*      
(0.246)      
 
Trade exposure toward 
UK (% of exports to 
UK) 
0.966      
(1.017)     
1.040      
(1.004)      
  
0.457      
(0.581)      
0.453      
(0.574) 
 
Germany   
0.122   
(0.156) 
   
0.111    
(0.133) 
Ireland   
0.094   
(0.102) 
   

















N 73 73 74  179 179 179 
R2 0.174 0.193 0.231  0.261 0.275 0.266 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the warmth of established party member statements about the EU, ranging from –1 (negative) to 
+1 (positive). Standard errors in parentheses. Fixed effect estimates not shown. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the .001, .01 
and .05 levels, respectively. 
 
Although the overall unity between national political elites and the EU is helpful for a strong 
negotiation position, it only allows limited insight into the details of the EU’s negotiation strategy. 
To uncover these details, we now move to a more fine-grained analysis of EU and national policy 
goals. Figure 5 maps these policy goals (for each Subject, we slice our data to Object = all, Context 
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= Brexit).24 It compares the overlap in stated policy position between pairs of actors. The circles 
represent individual policy goals. The position of the circles indicates the relative frequency in with 
which policy goals are mentioned. The size of the circles represents the overall frequency of the 
goals. For example, in the top left panel it can be seen that around 17 percent of the German 
political elite’s stated goals fall into the “manage Brexit” category, while this category comprises 
some 12 percent of all stated EU goals. We assume that if two actors had perfectly aligned goals, 
they would state the same goals with the same frequencies. In this case, all circles would line up 
along the dashed diagonal lines, indicating a correlation of 1 (bright green). By contrast, if goals 
are fully contradictory, circles would line up along the axes, indicating a correlation of 0 (dark red).  
     The three left panels of Figure 5 immediately reconfirm the overall strong policy cohesion 
between remaining EU member’s and the EU more generally (with correlations ranging from .57 
to .89). This is in marked contrast to the three right panels that show considerable antagonism in 
goals between remaining EU member’s and the UK (with correlations ranging from .06 to .22) 
with the only overlap being to avoid a hard Brexit, if possible, and managing the situation more 
generally. There are only a handful of non-alignments in goals between our three EU members 
and the EU at large. These have to have to do with Germany’s particular interest to win over the 
UK finance sector for Frankfurt; with Austria’s interest to win over the European Medicines 
Agency (EMA) to Vienna; and with Austria’s unwillingness to pay more into the EU budget to 
make up for the UK’s contributions. Ireland’s desire to keep up its close economic ties with the 
UK also stands out as an asymmetrically voiced interest – although these preferences were more 
than offset by the strong Irish pro-EU stance following Brexit as noted above.25   
 
Figure 5: Overlap of Stated Brexit Policy Goals – National Politicians vis-à-vis the EU and the UK 
                                                          
24  The focus on all Objects is useful for this analysis because many goals such as “Manage Brexit” are directed 
pursued by engaging with multiple counterparts on the national and EU level as well as with the UK.  
25  Overall, the share of the goal to ‘keep close relations’ with the UK relative to all goals and our trade exposure 
variable correlate with .99. The close economic linkages to the UK also made Ireland more supportive of EU 
concessions toward the UK prior to the Brexit referendum. In 2015, Ireland’s head of government Enda Kenny 
said that Ireland will back changes to the EU if this helps prevent Britain exiting the union, indicating that the 
Government would support “reasonable adjustments” if necessary (O’Connor, 2015).  
corr = .191 




Notes: The panels compare the overlap in stated policy position between the indicated pairs of actors. Circles represent policy goals. 
The position of the circles indicates the relative frequency with which policy goals are mentioned. The size of the circles represents 
the overall frequency of the goals. The y-axes show the frequency of stated policy goals by national politicians (established parties) 
as a percentage of all statements. The x-axes show the same measure for the EU and the UK, respectively. It is assumed that if two 
actors had perfectly aligned goals, they would state the same goals with identical frequency (i.e., more important goals, more fre-
quently). In this case, all circles would like up along the dashed diagonal lines – indicating a correlation of 1. If goals are fully contra-
dictory, circles would line up along the axes – indicating a correlation of 0. Underlying N = 134, 147, 104, 94, 188, and 209 (horizontally 
from top-left to bottom-right).  
 
Crucially, Figure 5 also offers an insight into the accommodation dilemma and the wider EU strat-
egy toward the UK. On the one hand, both the EU and its remaining members seek to avoid a 
hard Brexit – a goal that could in theory be reached through an accommodative negotiation strat-
egy. On the other hand, however, the insistence that there can be no cherry-picking on side of the 
UK and the constant demand for UK concessions – the most frequently referenced EU goal – 
reflects the deterrence strategy.26 Throughout the Brexit negotiations, the EU – with the backing 
                                                          
26  Note that the overlap in this tough negotiation stance is greatest between the EU and Germany. This is reflective 
of Germany’s relatively large bargaining power, which allows a more self-confident position toward the UK. In 
contrast, Austria and Ireland are comparatively stronger focused on softer diplomacy. This is true both internally 
(“EU unity”) and externally toward the UK (“Manage Brexit”). The former goal is pursued in particular by Austria 
during its EU presidency. The latter role is filled by Ireland, especially during the 2019 negotiations with the 
Johnson government that lead up to the revised Brexit agreement.  
corr = .590 
corr = .566 
corr = .219 
corr = .058 
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of the remaining members – has denied the UK any special treatment that would amount to a 
preferential treatment compared to non-EU members.  
     The EU’s tough stance began immediately after the Brexit referendum, with the EU and na-
tional politicians pressuring the UK to speedily initiate the official withdrawal process to prevent 
political instability and economic uncertainty (Wiegmann, 2016). A closer look at the relevant state-
ment reveals the underlying rationale: German vice-chancellor Sigmar Gabriel worried that popu-
list parties would benefit from the situation and that “centrifugal forces” in Europe would increase: 
“The Brexit referendum has divided Britain. To prevent Brexit from dividing Europe, too, the 
heads of state and government must now swiftly act and provide clarity” (Fried et al., 2016). This 
statement clearly reflects the concern that the encouragement effect of the Brexit vote would lead 
to further disintegration pressures. Implicitly, Gabriel’s statement may be read as a call for coun-
teracting deterrence policies.  
     After the initial pressure for the fast initiation of the official withdrawal process, the EU insisted 
on managing the ‘divorce’ before any talks about the future relationship would begin. Eventually, 
the EU decided, when sufficient progress had been reached to move to Phase II of the negotiations 
– namely after the UK had made the sought after concessions concerning its financial obligations 
and the permanent status of EU citizens in the UK. This hard stance continued throughout the 
negotiations, with the EU repeatedly refusing to move away from its principles despite the ongoing 
uncertainty and associated costs that the dragging negotiations produced.   
     While there was a clear appreciation of the economic costs associated with the possibility of 
the UK leaving the European Single Market, the political costs from a ‘domino effect’ were rec-
ognized as well. In the German Ministry of Finance, the encouragement effect was explicitly dis-
cussed: The position was that there cannot be an automatic unconditional access the Single Market 
because this could spark “imitation tendencies“ in countries with strong populist parties such as 
France, Austria, Finland, the Netherlands and Hungary. The “extent and scope of the imitation 
effects will depend to a large extent on how the UK is dealt with” an internal position paper reads, 
while the assessment the German Foreign Office was that “we need a clear statement: There must 
be no re-nationalization” (Sturm et al., 2016). An Austrian MP was cited in 2017 as saying: “This 
[Brexit] must under no circumstances turn into a success for the British, otherwise we can write 
off the EU and it falls apart” (Schaffer 2017).  
     Thus, there was a clear awareness of the short-term and long-term consequences of the EU’s 
response to the UK. The initial concern was clearly driven fact that the ‘Leave’ vote occurred and 
that this initially sparked demands by populists as shown in Figure 3 and Table 2 above. The more 
general worry, however, was that Brexit could lead to more sustained encouragement effects if the 
British actually end up with a better deal than what could be had within the EU.  
     An additional set of EU concerns related to the possibility that the UK might become an ‘un-
fair’ competitor outside of the EU’s regulatory influence. If the UK was allowed unconditional 
access to the Single Market while at the same time being able to set its own competition rules, the 
UK could gain competitive advantages by undermining European social and environmental stand-
ards. This would not only present an encouragement effect for eurosceptic populists. It would also 
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undermine the EU’s economic foundation and social cohesion by exacerbating trade competition 
and inequality – and thereby reinforce some of the factors that led to the rise of populism in the 
first place. In this context, German chancellor Angela Merkel spoke of a “competitor on our door-
step” and insisted that the further Britain moves away from EU rules, the more limited its access 
to the Single Market will be (Kolb and Finke 2019; Bolzen 2019; Finke 2020). In the same spirit, 
Austrian trade unionist Wolfgang Katzian spoke of a “Singapore at the gates of the EU” (Böhmer 
2019). Recently, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen reiterated what has been the EU 
position throughout: “There is no free ticket to the Single Market – only rights and obligations” 
(Bolzen 2020). 
 
Figure 6: Dissent and Concession – Comparing EU and UK Unity and Negotiation Success  
 
Notes: The left panel plots the percentage of news reports that document internal dissent in the EU and the EU in a given quarter. A 
value of, say, 50 percent indicates that half of all reports in that quarter referenced internal dissent. The right panel shows the reported 
number and type of concessions made by the EU and the UK, respectively. Possible options are denied (no concession), offered 
(offered to make a concession), and granted (actually made a concession). For the EU, dark blue indicates substantive concessions, 
while light blue indicates procedural concessions (i.e., the offering or granting of delays in the Brexit process). 
 
These factors and considerations help explain why the EU consistently managed to maintain in-
ternal unity and a consistent – as well as tough – bargaining position toward the UK despite evident 
short-term costs of this strategy. The Brexit proponents and government officials in the UK, how-
ever, appear to have failed to fully recognize these incentives. Rather, British officials were con-
stantly frustrated that they could not get through with their demands against the EU (which has a 
bargain power advantage to begin with). This aggravated pre-existing internal divisions in the UK 
and led to a situation of almost constant internal quarrel and stalemate with the EU.  
     Figure 6 (left panel) shows this situation graphically based on our data. The left panel plots the 
percentage of news reports that mention internal dissent in the EU and the UK in a given quarter. 
A value of fifty percent indicates that half of the reports in that quarter reference internal dissent. 
While dissent is rare in the EU, it is a constant feature of British politics throughout the Brexit 
negotiations. The right panel of Figure 6 links these conditions to negotiation outcomes. Specifi-
cally, the figure shows the type of concessions made by each party over time. The categories for 
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each side range from ‘denied’ (the side made no concession/denied to make concessions), ‘offered’ 
(the side offered to make a concession), and granted (the side actually made a concession). The 
panel demonstrates that internal levels of dissent and the type and number of concessions made 
during the Brexit negotiations clearly move in the same direction: UK concession strongly out-
weigh EU concessions. In fact, the one major EU concession is the acceptance of reforms con-
cerning the UK’s EU membership prior to the Brexit referendum; a concession that was never 
implemented due to the UK’s ‘Leave’ vote. Thereafter, EU concessions are procedural rather sub-
stantive in nature (light blue) and concern the granting of delays and extensions in the Brexit ne-
gotiations. At the same time, the EU has consistently refused to re-open negotiations on the with-
drawal agreement.  
     By contrast, the UK makes a range of substantive concessions. This begins with accepting the 
EU’s terms on the ‘divorce bill’ and the permanent status of EU nationals in the UK that made 
the EU decide that ‘sufficient progress’ had been reached to move to Phase II of the negotiations. 
The UK then concedes taking part in the 2019 European Parliament elections to secure an exten-
sion of the Brexit deadline. The last major concession consists of Boris Johnson accepting an 
internal maritime border in the Irish sea in order to ‘get Brexit done’ – a concession that Theresa 
May had earlier said “no British prime minister could ever accept” (The Irish Times 2018). 
6   Discussion and Conclusion  
With these concessions, the UK has bought its way out of the European Union, which it officially 
left by 31 January 2020. While this means that the Brexiteers have achieved their goal to withdraw 
from the EU, they have so far achieved little more. In particular, the UK’s achievements fall far 
short on what the Brexiteers promised before the referendum. When the transition period (which 
de facto extends the UK’s EU membership status) ends by the end of the year, it remains to be 
seen to what degree the UK will be able to benefit from its newly gained sovereignty.  
     In particular, with regard to the hoped-for trade deals, the prospects do not look too well. The 
EU has made its preparations for a hard Brexit and appears unlikely to offer a better deal in the 
future than it has in the past. The U.S. has not been the easiest partner under the Trump Admin-
istration and the upcoming U.S. elections, the Corona situation, and Black Lives Matter mean that 
the priorities in Washington currently lie elsewhere. Yet even under ‘normal’ circumstances would 
the UK likely have a hard time to negotiate substantive trade agreements with both the U.S. and 
the EU given the widely differing views on social and environmental standards on both sides of 
the Atlantic and the difficulties to reconcile these in overlapping trade regimes.    
     But also beyond trade, the future currently looks quite uncertain for the UK. While this is no 
good news for the British, it may be seen as good news by those who worry about the threat of 
populism across the rest of the EU and beyond – because the UK’s Brexit experience provides 
new information on where the lure of populists might lead. 
     In this article, we presented evidence from a news media analysis of elite discourse in three EU 
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member states, which suggests that Brexit did indeed create a deterring precedent. At least tempo-
rarily, this precedent appears to have significantly reduced the appeal of populist arguments and 
lead eurosceptic parties to tone down their demands and moderate their positions.  
     According to our argument, the deterrent content of Brexit comes from two sources. One the 
one hand, we hold that populist arguments, which typically promise simple solutions to complex 
problems, have an inherently self-defeating component when put to the test. In office, it is harder 
than in the opposition role to talk away problems or accuse others of at their heart. Somewhat 
ironically, this makes too much success dangerous for populists because, in office, they need to 
actually deliver what they promised. The visibility of government office, the requirement to act 
rather than only talk, and constant media scrutiny provide a wealth of information to the public. 
This allows observers both at home and abroad to learn about the incumbent’s merits. The Brex-
iteers arguably did not do all too well in this process. And it remains to be seen if Donald Trump 
survives this year’s elections given his current record in office.  
     On the other hand, we content that this ‘baseline effect’ can be further reinforced by strategic 
actors. Concretely, in the context of withdrawals from international institutions, we hold that the 
institution itself has incentives to accept short-term costs to gain long-term stability by making life 
harder for anti-globalist populist governments. While the weight of this option is likely to depend 
on the bargaining power of the withdrawing state relative to the affected institution, this effect is 
likely to play some role in any potential withdrawal case. In the context of the EU, which is at the 
more powerful end of the spectrum, this effect has certainly played a major role and has likely 
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Figure A1: Established Parties and Governments – Warmth of Statements about the UK over Time  
 
Notes: Points describe the warmth of statements reported in national newspapers, ranging from –1 (negative) to +1 (positive). Posi-
tions are averaged by month jittered for better visibility. Lines and shaded areas are loess estimates with 95% confidence intervals 











Table A1: Text-Corpus Sources - Daily Newspapers by Country 
Country  Newspaper Ideological leaning 
Austria Der Standard liberal 
Austria Die Presse liberal, center-right 
Austria Kurier liberal 
Germany BILD center-right 
Germany Die Welt center-right 
Germany Süddeutsche Zeitung center-left 
Germany Handelsblatt liberal 
Ireland  Irish Daily Mail center-right 
Ireland Irish Independent center-right 
Ireland The Irish Times liberal 
 
Notes: Newspaper selection based on largest (highest circulation) nation-wide appearing dailies. Selection also reflects some avail-











Table A2: Text-Corpus Search Terms – Selection Criteria for Corpus Documents 
Search terms packages Package content 
(Brexit OR (UK OR United Kingdom OR Britain) w/5 (EU OR European Union) w/5 
(withdraw* OR leav* OR ((remain* OR continu*) w/5 member*)) OR (UK OR United 
Kingdom OR Britain) w/5 ((referendum OR renegotiat*) w/5 member* w/5 (EU OR 
European Union)) OR (UK OR United Kingdom OR Britain) w/5 (relations OR relation-




(XXX w/5 (EU OR European Union) w/5 (withdraw* OR leav* OR ((remain* OR con-
tinu*) w/5 member*)) OR YYY w/5 (relations OR relationship OR public opinion OR 
attitude w/1 (with OR to)) w/5 (EU OR European Union OR Europe)) OR (XXX w/5 
(referendum OR renegotiat*) AND member* w/5 (EU OR European Union) OR YYY 
w/5 ((EU OR Europ*) w/5 integration)) 
OR 
 
(XXX w/10 ((euro-sceptic* OR anti-euro* OR euro-phil* OR pro-euro*) OR (euroscep-
tic* OR antieuro* OR europhil* OR proeuro*)) ) OR ZZZ 
Brexit and the UK’s 








The target country’s 
(potential) withdrawal 









Notes: AND = Boolean ‘and’, OR = Boolean ‘or’; * = wildcard; w/5 = ‘within 5’ (requirement for expressions to the left and right to be 
found within 5 words of each other); XXX = placeholder for country name wildcard (e.g., Ireland*); YYY = placeholder for country 








Table A3: How well is Brexit going? Hand-coded Sentiment of Brexit Events (Figure 2, left panel) 
Date Sentiment Event 
01/01/2012 0 Pre-Brexit. 
23/01/2013 
0 
Cameron announces referendum; referendum is included in Tory election mani-
festo. 
07/05/2015 2 Tories win elections.  
19/02/2016 2 Cameron secures some EU concessions on the UK’s EU membership. 
23/06/2016 
0 
Brexit referendum – majority for “Leave“ against Cameron’s recommendation. 
EU concessions now vain.  
24/06/2016 -3 Cameron resigns. 
13/07/2016 -2 May becomes PM. 
18/04/2017 -1 May announces a snap election to ‘strengthen her hand’ in negotiating Brexit. 
22/05/2017 -1 EU adopts negotiating directives. 
08/06/2017 -3 Tories lose majority in elections. 
26/06/2017 -2 May forced to form minority government. 
08/12/2017 -1 Breakthrough in Phase I reached. UK concessions.  
15/12/2017 -1 EU agrees to move to Phase II. 
19/03/2018 0 First draft Withdrawal Agreement. 
08/07/2018 -2 Davis resigns in protest. 
09/07/2018 -2 Johnson resigns in protest. 
13/11/2018 0 UK and EU agree on Withdrawal Agreement. 
14/11/2018 0 May secures her cabinet’s backing for the deal. 
25/11/2018 
1 




May postpones the vote in the House of Commons on her Brexit deal, anticipat-
ing no support for the Agreement. 
13/12/2018 -1 May survives a vote of no confidence. 
15/01/2019 -3 Withdrawal Agreement rejected by Parliament (I).  
12/03/2019 -3 Withdrawal Agreement rejected by Parliament (II). 
20/03/2019 -3 May asks for Brexit extension. 
29/03/2019 -3 Withdrawal Agreement rejected by Parliament (III). 
10/04/2019 -1 Extension until 31 Oct. 2019 granted. 
24/05/2019 -2 May announces resignation. 
24/07/2019 0 Johnson becomes PM. 
28/08/2019 -1 Parliament is suspended (Johnson). 
03/09/2019 -2 21 Conservative MPs are expelled (Johnson). 
09/09/2019 -1 Johnson obliged to seek 3rd extension by law (Parliament). 
24/09/2019 -2 The UK’s Supreme Court rules the suspension of parliament unlawful. 
17/10/2019 1 Revised Withdrawal Agreement agreed. UK concession on Irish border.  
19/10/2019 
-1 
Parliament temporarily withholds its approval for the revised agreement. John-
son is obliged to seek another Brexit extension. 
28/10/2019 0 Third Brexit extension. 
31/10/2019 0 Parliament calls a general election.  
12/12/2019 0 Tories win election. 
23/01/2020 1 Withdrawal Agreement is ratified. 
29/01/2020 1 EP ratifies Withdrawal Agreement. 
31/01/2020 0 UK leaves the EU. 
01/02/2020 0 Transition period begins. 
16/04/2020 -1 Johnson announces no extension of transition period. Hard Brexit likely. 
16/06/2020 -1 No extension of transition period confirmed. 
 
Notes: Subject = speaker, person making the statement. Object = object of speech, person or subject that is spoken about. Context 
= policy context in which the speaker’s statement is made. Warmth = sentiment, friendliness of the subject’s relation to the object. 
Action = speaker’s (cited) activity or type of statement. Goal = speaker’s (explicit or implicit) policy goal. Only Variables values that 




Table A4: Coding Scheme – Variables, Variables Values, and Value Frequencies 









EU unity; coherence  
(281) 
Media; com-









Manage Brexit (136) 














































  Deny (54) Political system stability 
(33) 
Scotland (10)    Be in dissent 
(54) 
Peace (Irish-Irish border) 
(31) 
    Report dis-
sent (media) 
(48) 
Leave the EU (34) 
    Make offer 
(25) 
(No) hard Brexit (dissent) 
(24) 
    Express 
warning (22) 
Brexit delay (24) 
    Cite poll (me-
dia) (21) 
Established party not be-
ing driven by challenger 
party (23) 
    Concede 
(21)  
No higher payments (EU 
budget) (21) 
     Healthy economy; busi-
ness (17) 
     No cherry picking (17) 
     No re-negotiation (17) 
     Keep close relations to 
UK (16) 
     No deeper EU integra-
tion (15) 
     Win UK finance sector 
(11) 
     EU reform or leave (chal-
lenger party) (16) 
 
Notes: Subject = speaker, person making the statement. Object = object of speech, person or subject that is spoken about. Context 
= policy context in which the speaker’s statement is made. Warmth = sentiment, friendliness of the subject’s relation to the object. 
Action = speaker’s (cited) activity or type of statement. Goal = speaker’s (explicit or implicit) policy goal. Only Variables values that 
appear 10 or more times are cited above.  
 
 
 
